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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings by altering the findings of 
fact of the Trial court and justifying a remedy of reformation, 
when clearly the Trial Court determined facts which warrant a 
remedy of rescission. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by substantially 
departing from ordinary judicial proceedings when the Court relied 
on facts that were contrary to the record and Findings of Fact as 
follows: 
A. that the legal description of the property in the 
deed did not include the 1.11 acre figure when the legal 
description did; and 
B. the legal description in the deed was not the same as 
the legal description in the Earnest Money Agreement when in 
all material respects the deed was; and 
C. that acreage was not important to the parties when it 
was the very assumption upon which the parties based their 
agreement; and 
D. that the Court found there was a mistaken legal 
description made in the process of reducing the agreement to 
writing when it was not a mistaken legal description but 
rather a mistaken survey upon which the parties relied to sell 
the property at all. 
E. That the Trust did not convey property described in 
the deed where the description the Trust conveyed was the one 
intended. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter was filed 
October 24, 1990, and is published as Grahn v. Gregory at 146 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 47. (A copy is attached hereto as Appendix "C".) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision 
of the Court of Appeals in this action by a writ of certiorari 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a.) and § 78-2-2(5) (1990). 
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The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on October 24, 
1990. Appellants filed a Petition for Rehearing and an Order 
denying the Petition was entered on November 14, 1990. Appellants 
filed a Motion for Extension of Time for filing Petition for 
Certiorari on December 11, 19 90 on the grounds that counsel for 
Appellants would have insufficient time to prepare the Petition by 
deadline since they had another appellate brief due in another 
case. The Order granting the extension for thirty (30) days was 
entered on December 12, 1990. Pursuant to the Order, the deadline 
for filing the Petition for Certiorari is January, 14, 1991. The 
Petition is being filed timely, therefore is subject to this 
Court's review. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a civil matter which was originally decided in the 
Third District Court for the State of Utah. The appellants 
appealed the matter to the Utah Supreme Court, and the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. As 
described above, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its decision 
and the opinion has since been published in the Utah Advanced 
Reports, cited as Grahn v. Gregory, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 47. The 
Appellants filed a Petition for Rehearing, which was denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts of this case are more fully set forth with detailed 
citation to the record in Appellants' briefs filed with the Utah 
Court of Appeals. In order to conform this Petition to the page 
limitation set forth in the Rules of Appellate Procedure for 
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Petitions for Certiorari, it would be impossible to include all the 
relevant facts of the case in detail here. For the Court's 
convenience, the Appellants have attached hereto as Appendix "A" a 
photocopy of the Statement of Facts from its Reply Brief in the 
Court of Appeals. The following is an abbreviated summary of those 
facts: 
1. The Appellant Trust owned a parcel of real property in 
Salt Lake County which included a house and driveway thereon. The 
Trust sought to subdivide off a one-half acre parcel of the 
property to convey to a beneficiary of the Trust, so that said 
beneficiary could build a separate house thereon. (Transcript 
(hereinafter "TR") pp. 286-289; pp. 416-419) 
2. The Trust contracted with a surveyor, Scott McNeil, to 
conduct a physical survey of the land and to prepare a written 
(drawn) survey and legal description of the parcel being 
subdivided. (TR pp. 222, 237, 238, 289, 418 and 419) 
3. Mr. McNeil was instructed to divide the half-acre parcel 
off the southeast portion of the property, using the driveway as a 
boundary, if possible. He was also specifically instructed that 
the parcel to be subdivided had to be at least one-half acre of 
land in order to conform with the zoning requirements for building 
on the property. The trust gave McNeil the legal description for 
the entire parcel which was an old legal description which 
purportedly contained 1.67 acres of land. (TRpp. 237, 238, 300, 
418, 419 and 422) 
4. Mr. McNeil conducted his physical survey to subdivide the 
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property, during which he made an error in turning a curve. Mr. 
McNeil did not discover the error, and consequently incorporated it 
into his survey drawing and into his placement of the survey 
stakes. He then prepared a legal description of the half-acre 
parcel from his survey. (TR pp. 227, 228, 419, 452, 453; Trial 
Exh. 1-P) 
5. The survey drawing showed that: (a) the driveway was 
located on the larger Estate parcel hereinafter referred to as 
Parcel 1, containing 1.11 acres, and (b) Parcel 2 (the one-half 
acre parcel) containing .56 acres. (Trial Exh. 1-P) 
6. The survey drawing illustrated that both of the Trust's 
conditions for subdividing the property could be met, i.e., that 
the driveway could stay on Parcel 1, and Parcel 2 would be a 
buildable parcel which contained at least one-half acre. (Trial 
Exh. 1-P) 
7. Parcel 2 was subsequently conveyed to the beneficiary of 
the Trust using the surveyor's legal description of Parcel 2, but 
she changed her mind about building because of the estimated cost, 
and, without ever learning that the surveyor had made a mistake, 
she reconveyed Parcel 2 back to the Trust. (TR pp. 157 and 420) 
8. Later, the Trust decided to sell the 1.67 acre property, 
and listed the property for sale. The listing agent represented to 
Grahns that the property could be sold in one parcel or separated 
into two parcels according to the survey and sold separately. The 
Trust agreed to subdivide the parcel and sell Grahns part of the 
property, since Grahns could not afford to purchase the entire lot, 
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but only Parcel 1. (TR pp. 7, 27, 28, 45, 57, 59, 99, 113 and 114) 
9. The real estate agent who had listed the property walked 
the property with the Grahns and indicated to them the old survey 
stakes placed by Mr. McNeil which had not been removed, and which 
showed that the driveway was included on the parcel with the 
existing house (Parcel 1). (TR pp. 56, 57, 86 and 139) 
10. Josephine Grahn obtained the legal description for Parcel 
1 from the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office which legal 
description the County presumably prepared from the legal 
description McNeil prepared for Parcel 2. (TR, p. 84) 
11. The parties entered into the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement using a legal description that the Grahns had obtained 
from the County which the County prepared by taking the old legal 
description of the entire parcel and subtracting from that 
description the property McNeil described as Parcel 2, according to 
his survey. On the legal description of Parcel 1, which the Trust 
and Grahns included in the Earnest Money Agreement showed that it 
contained 1.11 acres. The Earnest Money Agreement Grahns prepared 
also stated it was an Agreement to buy and sell "The 1.11 acre 
property according to the legal description on the exhibit attached 
hereto." (TR p. 84; Trial Exh. 2-P) 
12. Grahns knew when they purchased Parcel 1 that the Trust 
needed at least one-half acre on the smaller parcel in order to 
obtain a building permit for that parcel. In the Addendum attached 
to the Earnest Money Agreement, the parties made reference to the 
"half-acre parcel" at least five times. (TR p. 99; Trial Exh. 2-P) 
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13. When the Trust and Grahns closed on the purchase of 
Parcel 1, they used the legal description attached to the Earnest 
Money Agreement. The legal description attached to the Earnest 
Money Agreement was in abbreviated terms so when the title company 
presumably prepared the final deed they wrote out in long-hand the 
abbreviated terms and omitted the reference to 1.11 acres. They 
also supplied clarifying language regarding radius and curvature. 
The description used in the deed was identical in metes and bounds, 
size and shape. However, Grahns demanded a warranty from the Trust 
that Parcel 1 was legally subdivided. Grahns also requested that 
the Trust give them a 25 foot easement from the road. The Trust 
refused but finally agreed to give Grahns a 15 foot easement along 
the road. The Trial Court found the parties accepted that 1.11 
acres was the size of Parcel 1. (Trial Exh. 2-P; Trial Exh. 15-D; 
TR pp. 182-184; Record pp. 530-538, Finding No. 13) 
14. Appellants Bradshaw subsequently contracted with the 
Trust to purchase Parcel 2. Mr. Bradshaw obtained a copy of the 
erroneous survey drawing from Mrs. Gregory (the parties had not 
discovered the mistake at that time) and, using that survey, 
designed a house to build on Parcel 2. When Mr. Bradshaw went onto 
the property on Parcel 2 to begin measuring for his house, he 
discovered that the house he had designed using the survey would 
not fit on the parcel. He then informed the Gregorys that 
something was wrong and the Gregorys contacted Mr. McNeil. Mr. 
McNeil came to the property and conducted another physical survey 
in which he discovered that he had originally made an error in 
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turning a curve. The legal description of Parcel 2 included the 
road. (Record, pp. 46 and 47; TR pp. 169-171, 369, 372, 373, 381, 
383, 397, 398; Trial Exh. 7-P) 
15. All the parties to both purchases testified at trial that 
they were relying on the erroneous survey when they made their 
contracts. (TR pp. 81-83, 168, 369) 
16. There was no overlap in the deeds for Parcels 1 and 2. 
Grahns never had a recorded interest in Parcel 2. (TR pp. 63-64) 
17. At the time the parties discovered the mistake, the 
Bradshaws and Trust had not closed on the sale of Parcel 2, but 
subsequently did close because they believed they had a binding 
contract. (TR pp. 175-177) 
18. The surveyor performed a revised survey using the road as 
the boundary between the two parcels. This survey moved the 
property line approximately 20 feet. This increases the size of 
Parcel 1 by approximately .20 acres. Subtracting from Parcel 2 the 
15 foot aesthetic easement which runs along the road, the useable 
space of Parcel 2 is further reduced to approximately 1/3 of the 
assumed .56 acres. (Trial Exh. 19-D) 
19. As a result of the mistake, the Trust and Bradshaws were 
left with a parcel of ground that is less than one-half acre, 
substantially steeper than the originally surveyed parcel and only 
large enough to build a much smaller home. (Trial Exh. 19-D) 
20. Had the mistake not occurred, the Trust would never have 
subdivided the property into two parcels, nor would they have sold 
the property as two parcels, but would have sold the property as 
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one parcel. They would not have sold Parcel 1 to Grahns. (TR pp. 
209, 301, 422, 316) 
ARGUMENT 
I • THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING OF REFORMATION CREATES A CONTRACT 
FOR THE PARTIES WHICH THEY DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE. 
When the Trust agreed to sell Parcel 1 to Grahns, the 
parties were relying upon one written (drawn) survey and 
corresponding survey stakes for their understanding of the sizes 
and boundaries of the two parcels. The survey was performed years 
earlier and not as part of the sale. The Trust obtained the 
erroneous survey for the purpose of subdividing off a portion of 
land on the southeast corner of the property to convey separately 
to someone who could build a house thereon. The Trust had made the 
subdivision conditional upon being able to include the driveway on 
the parcel containing the existing house (Parcel 1), but still 
leaving at least one-half acre on the smaller southeast parcel 
(Parcel 2) since the zoning regulations for that area required one-
half acre to build. Unknown to anyone, the surveyor had made an 
error in calculations while conducting his physical survey, and the 
resulting written survey, upon which the Grahns and Gregorys later 
relied when they contracted for the sale of Parcel 1, correctly 
reflected the sizes of the parcels the parties intended to convey 
but did not reflect the actual location of the driveway. The 
survey showed the existing house and driveway to be situated within 
the confines of the parcel Grahns were purchasing, showed the 
boundary between the two parcels to be the southeast side of the 
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driveway, and showed the southeast parcel (Parcel 2) to contain .56 
acres. The survey was a condition precedent to the sale of Parcel 
1. Therefore, the parties relied on the survey in order to 
subdivide the property to accomplish both sales. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Mooney v. G.R* Associates, 746 
P. 2d 1174 (Ut.App. 1987) stated "It is well settled that a contract 
is voidable if there is a mutual mistake of material fact. J[ci. at 
1178 (citing to Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 1982) and 
Langston v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ) . See 
also Tanner v. District Judges of Third Judicial District, 649 P.2d 
5 (Utah 1982) . 
The Grahns, the Trial Court and Court of Appeals argue that 
the parties intended to include the land to the road in the sale of 
Parcel 1. They argue the buyers are entitled to a reformation of 
their agreement to include additional land to include the road 
because of an error of the draftsman of the legal description. 
Here, however, the mistake in the case goes far deeper than 
that. It was not a mistake in reducing the agreement to writing, 
but rather a mistake in the bargaining process. A mistake that 
changed not only the amount of acreage the parties intended to 
convey, but changed the size, shape, boundary, marketability and, 
therefore, the value and use of the remaining parcel. Now, instead 
of conveying one parcel of 1.11 acres and a second of .56 acres, 
the lower courts would force the seller to convey one parcel of 
1.30 acres leaving a parcel of less than a half-acre with a 15 foot 
easement that runs almost entirely along the northwest border, 
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further restricting the use of the property. The Trust is left 
with a parcel of property where they lose the flat portion of the 
parcel. They are left with the steepest part of the parcel as 
being the buildable space. Whether the remaining lot is buildable 
at all is problematic. It will require a petition to the County 
and approval by them in order to build. Taking the easement from 
the additional l/5th of the lot taken restricts the parcel in one 
place to a narrow neck of property. The sellers never intended the 
conveyance to create such a property. 
When the seller sold the property, they conveyed exactly what 
they intended to convey in the deed. The mistake concerned the 
location of the road, not the legal description of the property. 
The Trust conveyed exactly the amount of acreage they intended to 
convey - 1.11 acres, leaving .56 acres for Parcel 2. This is far 
different from a scriveners mistake, which the Court of Appeals and 
Grahns contend. 
In fact, the Trial Court found that acreage was important to 
the parties. In its finding of fact, the Trial Court found the 
parties accepted 1.11 acres as the size of Parcel 1. This 
assumption was based on the need for a minimum of .5 acres for 
Parcel 2. The Court, in an effort to be fair, further found that 
because the parties did not intend to convey more than 1.11 acres 
and because Grahns were now receiving approximately 1.3 acres, the 
Trial Court ordered that Grahns pay for the additional acreage, 
which the parties did not intend to convey. The Court of Appeals 
reversed this ruling. The Trial Court erred also in remaking the 
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contract. 
In footnote 5 of the Court of Appeal's decision, they 
distinguish "on their facts" several cases the Trust cites in 
support of their position. In Eiland v. Powell, 136 W.Va. 25, 65 
S.E.2d 737, 742 (1951) the legal description was identical to the 
legal description in the contract, thus there was no mistake by a 
drafter, just in the representations made by the seller. This case 
is right on point with the subject case. Although the Court of 
Appeals necessarily needed to distinguish that case, the legal 
description in the agreement and in the deed were exactly what the 
parties intended and were in essential terms identical. Thus, 
there was no mistake made by a drafter of the deed. 
The Court of Appeals also attempted to distinguish the case of 
Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. McGraff, 249 Md. 480, 240 A2d 245, 249 
(Ct. App. 1968). In the Chesapeake case, there was no mistake in 
the legal description of the property; the seller had 
misrepresented the boundary. The Court correctly concluded the 
parties did not come to an agreement in the first instance. The 
Chesapeake case is also directly on point with the case before this 
Court. 
Lastly, the Court of Appeals attempts to distinguish the case 
of Bartlett v. Dept. of Transportation, 40 Md. App. 47, 388 A.2d 
930 (1978) in which the Court dealt with the issue of reformation 
of a deed when the parties believed the parcel to be 2-1/2 acres 
smaller than it actually was. The Bartlett Court reasoned that if 
a discrepancy in the size of the parcel would not have prevented 
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the party from entering the contract, the mistake is immaterial and 
reformation is appropriate. JTd. at 933. Bartlett is also 
identical to the case before this Court. The sellers would not 
have entered into the agreement had they known the effect the 
mistaken survey and location of the road would have on the agreed 
exchange of performances. The mistake seriously affects the use 
and value of Parcel 2. This certainly was not the Trust's 
intention when they sold the property. The extent of the Trust's 
injury will not be known until such time as the County considers a 
request for a variance and a building permit. 
The Court of Appeals was also mislead by finding that only 
Gregory's self-serving statements support his argument that the 
acreage was essential to the parties' agreement. The Earnest Money 
Agreement specifically references the amount of acreage of Parcel 
1 and Parcel 2. The Gregorys' intentions with respect to 
subdivision of the property were made known at the outset. 
In fact, the survey was a condition precedent to the Trust's 
ability to even sell the parcel to Grahns. But for the survey, the 
Grahns never could have purchased Parcel 1. Therefore, the sale 
itself assumed the survey was valid. Without the survey, the Trust 
would have sold the entire 1.67 acre parcel as one piece. But for 
the Trust's beneficence in trying to work with the Grahns and in 
reliance on the survey, could the Grahns have purchased the 
property. In other words, the entire sale was based upon the 
erroneous survey. 
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NO MEETING OF THE MINDS 
The property the parties intended to buy and sell never 
existed. That is to say, a parcel consisting of 1.11 acres 
including the road. Therefore, the parties could not have had a 
meeting of the minds for the purchase and sale of the property 
because it did not exist. This was not merely a mistake in 
reducing the parties intentions to a written document. This was 
not merely a scriveners mistake. 
In this case, the surveyor had prepared the legal description 
for Parcel 2 from his survey; therefore, the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals embraced Grahns' position that, since the Grahns 
and Gregorys intended for Parcel 1 to include the driveway and 
Grahns' legal description on their deed does not contain the land 
under the driveway, then this was a case of a mistake in the legal 
description which warranted rescission. The parties in this case 
based their agreement on erroneous assumptions. 
The trial court ruled that the Grahn Deed be reformed to 
include acreage from the other parcel which actually contained the 
driveway, but the trial court, in an effort to be fair, and 
realizing that his ruling of reformation would give the Grahns more 
acreage than the parties had intended ruled that the Grahns must 
pay for the additional acreage received through reformation of 
their deed. 
The remedy of reformation is proper when there is a meeting of 
the minds in an antecedent agreement but, in the process of 
reducing an agreement to writing, the draftsman makes an error and 
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the resulting written instrument does not reflect the actual 
agreement which the parties made. 66 AM. JUR. 2d Reformation of 
Instruments, s 13 (1973); Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., et al, 
37 N.E.2d 760 (111. 1941); Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. McGraff, 240 
A.2d 245 (Md.App. 1968) 
Logically, in a case where reformation is proper, the reformed 
instrument must reflect what the parties actually agreed upon. The 
lower Court attempted to make an agreement for the parties which 
they did not themselves make. Mrs. Grahn testified that the 
Gregorys agreed to subdivide the property according to the survey 
and sell Parcel 1 separately to the Grahns because Grahns could not 
afford the entire piece of property. But Gregorys testified that 
they would not have agreed to do so had they known of the mistake 
in the survey. Therefore, knowledge of the true nature of the 
property would have resulted in the Gregorys' deciding not to 
subdivide the property but to sell it in one piece. Since Grahns 
could not afford the entire piece, Gregorys would have never made 
any contract with Grahns. Moreover, even though Grahns argue that 
they were not concerned with Parcel 2 or the Gregorys' intentions 
regarding that parcel, it is not necessary to establish that the 
mistake affected Grahns' intentions, because "[a] mistake which 
leads one or both parties to enter into a contract which they would 
not have entered into had they known the facts will not justify 
reformation." 66 AM. JUR. 2D Reformation of Instruments s 13 
(1973); Metzler v. Bolen, 137 F. Supp. 457, (DC ND 1956) (emphasis 
supplied). 
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Neither lower court specifically ruled by clear and convincing 
evidence that the Trust did not convey what it intended. In fact, 
the Trust conveyed in the deed the property they intended to 
convey, based on the survey. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDING REGARDING ACREAGE WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, AND, 
IMPROPERLY MADE ITS OWN FINDINGS THAT ACREAGE WAS NOT 
IMPORTANT TO THE TRANSACTION, AND THAT REFORMATION OF THE 
GRAHN DEED WILL NOT AFFECT THE BUILDABILITY OF PARCEL TWO, 
NEITHER OF WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE RECORD. 
Grahns argue that they were not concerned with the amount of 
acreage they were purchasing, but just wanted the driveway, and 
therefore the mistake was not mutual. Whether they were concerned 
about acreage or not is irrelevant. Grahns believed they were 
purchasing the driveway in reliance on the survey stakes, on the 
drawn survey which showed the driveway as the boundary, and on 
Gregorys' representation that Grahns were purchasing the driveway, 
all of which were innocently based upon the erroneous survey. In 
the case of Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. McGraff, 240 A. 2d 245 
(Md.App. 1968), a case close on point with this case, the Court of 
Appeals in Maryland stated: 
Where the facts show the mutual mistake to be 
actually a product of false, although 
innocent, representations as to the subject 
matter of the contract, the result is that the 
parties have not in fact come to any 
agreement, and reformation will not correct 
the effort. This is easily absorbed within 
the facts of the present case. It is not the 
description of the land in the contract which 
is a mistake, but the identity of the lot 
itself. Therefore, reformation was not the 
proper remedy. 
Id. at 249. 
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Even if Grahns were not concerned about acreage, it was all 
important to the transaction since the contract would not have been 
made at all had the Gregorys known that including the driveway with 
Parcel 1 would rob Parcel 2 of essential acreage. 
The Trial Court made a specific finding of fact that 1.11 
acres was the amount of acreage accepted by Grahns and Gregorys as 
the amount being purchased and sold for Parcel 1. The Court would 
not have made that finding if it believed acreage was not 
important. The trial court understood that by reforming Grahns' 
deed, he was giving them more land than they had actually purchased 
or than Gregorys had intended to sell them. In an effort to be 
fair, he therefore ruled that Grahns pay for that extra land. 
Thus, he recognized that acreage was important, but failed to 
recognize that rescission, not reformation, would be the proper 
remedy hers*. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with Grahns' argument that acreage 
was not important to their transaction and that therefore the 
mistake was not mutual. The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the 
Trial Court's finding regarding acreage was "clearly erroneous" is 
inconsistent with the record. The findings of fact that the 
parties understood the private drive was the boundary and included 
within the legal description of Parcel 1, and that they understood 
Parcel 1 to contain 1.11 acres do not conflict because the parties 
were under mistaken assumptions because of the survey. It is 
undoubtedly true that Grahns are happy with the results in the 
courts below since, not only do they receive additional acreage 
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free, but the adjacent lot will likely be rendered unbuildable. 
Grahns will effectively have the use of the entire piece of 
property even though they paid only for 1.11 acres. 
The Trial Court also made its own finding that Parcel 2 is 
still buildable. Apparently, the Court partially based that on the 
comments of Grahns' counsel in their brief and at the oral argument 
before the Court of Appeals. Counsel stated: "Well, your honor, 
it is buildable, and in fact the only testimony in trial said that 
it was buildable. The Grahns brought in the County Planning and 
Zoning Manager, Mr. Reynolds, who indicated there could be a 
variance granted. . . he indicated that he felt in his testimony that 
there could be variance granted if one were asked for ... so the 
evidence in court . . . was that the lot is buildable and there is no 
unconscionable situation which would occur by enforcing the 
contract as the parties agreed." (Refer to the tape of the oral 
argument before the Court of Appeals which is on record.) Mr. 
Reynolds actually testified: 
(By Mr. Woodbury on cross examination of Mr. Reynolds:) 
Q. Now, is it my understanding that you said 
a variance could be attained? 
A. I didn't say it could. They may apply and maybe it 
will be approved; but that is a way of proceeding 
with a reduction of area. 
Q. Okay. I stand corrected. But the buildability of 
the lot would still be an issue that would have to 
be approved; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
(See excerpt from Transcript attached hereto as Appendix "B") 
The property on Parcel 2 is very steep. The portion of that 
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parcel which is the most level will be severely reduced by the 
reformation of Grahnsr deed. The steepness and terrain of the 
property were the reasons why that parcel needed to contain at 
least one-half acre exactly where the Trust wanted it before they 
would subdivide the property. If the deed on the other parcel is 
reformed, the remaining property on parcel two will be so steep 
that it could very well be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain 
a variance to build. 
III. BRADSHAWS ARE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, WHICH CUTS OFF THE RIGHT 
OF REFORMATION. 
In the case of Hottinqer v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah, 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "...the right of 
reformation of a deed can be cut off by purchase of the property by 
a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the mistake." 
The Court of Appeals recognized that this Court defined "bona fide 
purchaser" in Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1978), as 
"one who takes property without actual or constructive knowledge of 
facts which are sufficient to put him on notice of the 
complainant's equity," and also recognized that this Court, in 
defining notice, has stated that 
[ajctual or constructive notice defeats a 
subsequent purchaser's interest. A subsequent 
purchaser must therefore, show that he had no 
actual notice, i.e., no personal knowledge, of 
a prior conveyance or that the prior 
conveyance did not impart constructive notice, 
i.e., was not recorded before his conveyance 
in the same land was recorded. 
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 906 n.2 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have ignored 
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that the prior cases in Utah established that the "notice" which 
defeats a subsequent purchasers interest is notice of a prior 
conveyance of the same land he is purchasing, not merely notice 
that his survey contains an error. There was no overlap in the 
deeds. At the time the mistake was discovered, Bradshaw had 
secured an equitable interest in the parcel he was buying through 
a contract to purchase. Grahns had not secured any ownership 
interest, equitable or otherwise, in any portion of that parcel. 
Even when Bradshaws closed and took title to Parcel 2 no prior 
conveyance had been made of any portion of the property he was 
purchasing. Therefore Bradshaws conform to this Court's definition 
of a bona fide purchaser since they had no actual or constructive 
notice, not even at the time they closed, of any prior conveyance 
of the same land they were purchasing. 
The Utah Supreme Court should grant certiorari to review this 
issue because the previous law in Utah on this subject contradicts 
the finding of the trial court and affirmation of the Court of 
Appeals that Bradshaws were not bona fide purchasers which would 
cut off the right to reform the Grahn deed. 
The Utah Supreme Court confirms this point in Ingram v. 
Forrer, 563 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1977). The Court held "an honest 
difference of understanding as to what the contract was is fatal to 
reformation for in such case there is no such meeting of the minds 
of the parties and no pre-existing agreement to which the written 
instrument can be conformed." Id. at 182. 
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CONCLUSION 
The result of Mr. McNeil's mistake in conducting and preparing 
his survey, was that the survey showed the driveway to be located 
within the legal description of Parcel 1, when it was actually 
located within the legal description of Parcel 2. Although 
Gregorys intended to sell the driveway to Grahns, they were relying 
on the erroneous survey. Gregorys did not intend to convey any 
more acreage to Grahns than they did convey because doing so 
subtracts essential acreage from the other parcel, leaving it 
unbuildable under the zoning regulations. When Gregorys agreed to 
subdivide the land and sell Parcel 1 to Grahns, both the Grahns and 
the Gregorys relied upon the survey and corresponding survey 
stakes. The trial court correctly found that 1.11 acres was what 
Grahns accepted and Gregorys sold to them. Unbeknownst to anyone, 
the conditions of subdivision had not been met, and therefore the 
contract would not have been made had the mistake not occurred. 
The trial court erroneously reformed the Grahn deed to include 
acreage from Parcel 2 because that acreage contained the driveway 
the Grahns thought they were receiving. The very sale to Grahns 
itself depended upon the survey. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /jh day of January, 1991. 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON, P.C. 
J^fifeyHK. \Woodl5tfry J ^ ^ C " Rufesell S. Walker 
AlAonTQ^foa: Defendants/"'^ j A t to rney fo r Defendants / 
A p p e l l a n t s Bradshaws ^ ^ Appe l l an t s Bradshaws 
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Appendix A 
and that this was not merely a case of mistake in a legal 
description which did not reflect the intentions of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT 
TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Reply to Respondents' Brief, 
"Statement of the Case, Section B) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn have objected to the facts 
which Defendant Gregory set forth in his brief which cited to a 
document on record in this case entitled "Stipulated Facts". 
The attorneys for all the parties signed the Stipulation and 
it is part of the record herein. Plaintiffs'/Respondents' 
attorney contends in their brief that the Stipulation was to be 
used for the preliminary injunction hearing only, and that the 
Trial Court, in its Order Granting Injunction, "acknowledged the 
limited purpose for the Stipulation"- The Order stated only that 
the Court had received a written Stipulation of Facts "setting 
forth stipulated facts for the purposes of this hearing". It did 
not say, "for the limited purposes of this hearing" or "for the 
purposes of this hearing only", or that the document was not to 
be used again. Further, Plaintiffs/Respondents objected to the 
use of that document in their objection to the Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, but the Court did not respond to that 
objection in its Order denying that Motion. Defendant Gregory 
believes that the Stipulation of Facts, and thus the facts they 
set forth in their brief citing to it, are not inconsistent with 
the evidence and the rest of the record as to the relevant facts 
of this case. However, to eliminate as much confusion to the 
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Court as possible, we further clarify and support the relevant 
facts as follows: 
1. In 19 30, Albert and Carolyn Eccles acquired by deed a 
parcel of property known as the "Brookburn property". 
(Transcript, p. 416, L. 1-10) 
2. In 1960 or 1961, Carolyn Eccles and her husband Albert 
divided the property and deeded part of that land, retaining 
approximately 1.67 acres. The Trust is not aware of any requests 
made during that time to legally subdivide the property. 
(Transcript, p. 417, L. 16-20; p. 288, 289) 
3. In 1978, the Eccles conveyed the property to Harold L. 
Gregory, Trustee for and on behalf of the Marital and Family 
Trust of the Albert L. Eccles Family. (Transcript, p. 286, L. 4-
7; p. 287, L. 7-9) 
4. In 1984, Defendant Gregory divided the existing 1.67 
acre parcel of land at 2811 Brookburn Road to create two separate 
contiguous parcels so that Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of 
the Trust, could build a home on the smaller parcel being divided 
off. The Defendant Gregory hired Scott McNeil of McNeil 
Engineering ("Defendant McNeil") to survey the property and 
divide it into separate parcels. (Transcript, p. 289, L. 16-20; 
p. 418, L. 11 - p. 419, L. 5) 
5. Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the Trust, 
instructed Defendant McNeil to do a topographic survey to divide 
off and create a buildable parcel of at least one-half acre 
(hereinafter "Parcel 2") in the southeast corner off the 
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driveway, using the driveway as a boundary. (Transcript, p. 222, 
L. 7-21; p. 237, L. 23 - p. 238, L. 3; p. 418, L. 11 - p. 419, L. 
10) 
6. Mr. McNeil understood and was instructed that Defendant 
Gregory intended for him to divide off an available lot, 
consisting of at least one-half acre with the driveway as the 
boundary. (Transcript, p. 237, L. 23 - p. 238, L. 3) 
7. In instructing McNeil, Defendant Gregory intended for 
Parcel 2 to contain at least one-half acre because of zoning 
requirements in that area that required a one-half acre parcel in 
order to build. (Transcript, p. 300, L. 11-15; p. 422, L. 20-23) 
8. When McNeil Engineering did the physical survey, they 
made an error with their instruments while separating off the 
one-half acre parcel. (Transcript, p. 227 - 228) 
9. Consequently, the written survey conformed with the 
intentions of the parties, showing the southeast side of the 
driveway to be a boundary (thus making the driveway part of the 
1.11 acre Parcel 1), and showing Parcel 2 to contain .56 acre. 
(See Survey, Exhibit 1-P of Record, Addendum A hereto) 
10. Since Defendant McNeil had made a mistake while doing 
the physical survey, the written survey had incorporated that 
mistake and even though the survey showed the driveway on Parcel 
1, in reality it was within the confines of Parcel 2. (See 
Survey, Exhibit 19-D of record, which was the correct survey 
later done of both parcels). 
11. Defendant Gregory represented to the Grahns that a 
6 
half-acre parcel had been separated off by survey, and that they 
could either purchase the entire piece as one parcel, or they 
could just purchase the one-acre parcel. (Transcript, p. 57, L. 
2-9) 
12. While showing the property to prospective buyers, 
Gregory, through his agent, Noel Taylor, represented that the 
property could be purchased in one parcel for $345,000.00 or 
could be separated according to the survey stakes and sold as two 
parcels, for approximately $270,000.00 for Parcel 1 and 
approximately $75,000.00 for Parcel 2. (Transcript p. 27, L. 23-
p. 28 L. 2; p. 45, L. 5-14) 
13. The Grahns decided they could not afford the whole 
parcel, so they submitted an Earnest Money Agreement to Defendant 
Gregory on Parcel 1 with a first right of refusal on Parcel 2. 
That agreement was prepared by Grahns' attorney. (Transcript, p. 
59, L. 19-25; p. 99, L. 12-17; p. 7, L. 16-24; Exh. 2-P of 
record; Transcript, p. 113, L. 22- p. 114 L. 20) 
14. At the time the Defendant Gregory contracted with 
Grahns to sell Parcel 1, the Defendant Gregory did not intend to 
convey more acreage to the Grahns than he did convey by his 
contract, yet his representation to Grahns that the driveway was 
included with Parcel 1 was based on his erroneous assumption, 
while relying on the survey, that the driveway was situated 
within the 1.11 acre parcel which he were conveying. (Transcript, 
p. 208, L. 20 - p.209, L. 11; p. 300, L. 18 - p. 301, L. 9) 
15. The Grahns relied on the placement of the survey 
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boundary stakes which had been placed in error, as well as on the 
representations of the Defendant Gregory, based on that same 
survey, in believing that they were purchasing a 1.11 acre parcel 
of land which contained the driveway. (Transcript, p. 56, L. 22-
p. 57, L. 9; p. 86, L. 8-13; p. 139) 
16. When Grahns and Defendant Gregory and Mary Ethyl 
Gregory negotiated their contract, they were all relying on the 
erroneous survey. (Transcript, p. 94 L. 8-13) Mrs. Grahn 
testified she was relying on that survey even with the first 
offer they made. (Transcript, p. 97, L... 18-21) 
17. Defendant Gregory on behalf of the Trust intended to 
divide the property into two parcels and intended that the 
driveway remain with the parcel containing the house. However, 
his decision to divide the property at all times was based on the 
survey which showed he had a buildable, .56 acre parcel southeast 
of the driveway. Had he known this was a mistaken assumption, he 
never would have divided the property, and so would never have 
made this contract to sell Grahns Parcel 1 separately. 
(Transcript, p. 209, L. 5-11; p. 209, L- 1-4; p. 301, L. 17-21; 
p. 422, L. 10-23; p. 316, L. 5-17) 
18. Grahns were told that the division of the property was 
based on the survey. (Transcript, p. 94, L. 8-13) The Grahns 
were conscious of the division of the property during their 
negotiations because they could not afford the entire piece. 
(Transcript p. 99, L. 12-17) 
19. Defendant McNeil prepared a legal description of Parcel 
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2 as part of his survey of Parcel 2. (Transcript, p. 419, L. 18-
21; p. 452, L. 24 - p. 453, L. 20). 
20- On or about March 18, 1986, Grahns and Defendant 
Gregory entered into an Earnest Money Agreement for the purchase 
of Parcel 1, consisting of 1.11 acres. The amount of acreage 
they were purchasing appeared twice on the agreement, once on the 
first page of the document and once in the legal description 
attached to it. Their agreement also included (1) an option to 
Grahns of first right of refusal on Parcel 2 (referred to five 
times in the option as the "one-half acre" parcel), and (2) for a 
15-foot restrictive aesthetic and geologic easement on Parcel 2 
across the 15 feet nearest the driveway. (See Earnest Money 
Agreement, Exhibit 2-P of Record) 
21. The Trial Court found that 1.11 acres was the acreage 
which both Grahns and Gregory accepted as that which was being 
bought and sold. (Findings of Fact No. 13; Record p. 534) 
22. Grahns accepted the existing survey upon purchasing 
Parcel 1. Mrs. Grahn testified that at one point she did request 
a survey from Mrs. Gregory, but it was not at a time when she 
could get it, and after that Mrs. Grahn did not worry about 
getting a copy because the survey stakes were clearly laid out. 
(Transcript, p. 303, L. 1-8; p. 82, L. 15-19; p. 139) 
23. Grahns wanted a warranty by Defendant Gregory that the 
property was legally divided. Defendant Gregory had been 
receiving tax notices and paying taxes on the parcels separately 
for two years and understood that to mean the land was legally 
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divided, and thus made the warranty that, based upon his 
knowledge of the county records, the land was legally divided. 
(Transcript, p. 190, L. 5 - p. 191, L. 3) 
24. Josephine Grahn obtained the legal description for 
Parcel 1 from the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office which legal 
description the County presumably prepared from the legal 
description McNeil prepared for Parcel 2. (Transcript, p. 84) 
25. On or about August 1, 1986, Grahns and Defendant 
Gregory closed on the transaction for the sale of Parcel 1. 
(Transcript, p. 63, L. 23 - p. 64, L. 5) 
26. The legal description for Parcel 1 contained no calls 
to the driveway. (Transcript, p. 465, L. 3-7) 
27. There was no overlap in the deed descriptions for 
Parcels 1 and 2. (Transcript, p. 239, L. 1-5; p. 327, L. 1-13; p. 
197, L. 4-10) 
28. On September 1, 1986, Defendants Bradshaw entered into 
an Earnest Money Agreement with the Defendant Gregory to purchase 
Parcel 2. (See Earnest Money Agreement, Exhibit 7-P of Record) 
29. On September 1, 1986, Defendant Gregory gave written 
notice to Grahns of his intention to sell Parcel 2 to Bradshaws, 
and extended the right of first refusal. (See Exhibit 7-P of 
Record) 
30. Grahns did not exercise their right of first refusal to 
purchase Parcel 2, and when the option expired, Grahns told 
Defendant Gregory to go ahead with the Bradshaw sale. 
(Transcript, p. 69, L. 21 - p. 70, L. 9) 
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31. Bradshaws relied on McNeil's survey in tendering their 
September 1, 1986 offer which was accepted by Gregory after 
Grahns failed to exercise their option to purchase Parcel 2. 
(Transcript, p. 372, L. 11 - p. 373, L. 20; p. 397, L. 21 - p. 
398, L. 15) 
32. After Grahns received notice of the Bradshaws' offer 
and before their option expired, Josephine Grahn contacted 
Christi Bradshaw by phone and informed her that it looked as if 
Grahns were not going to be able to exercise their option, but 
informed Christi Bradshaw that before building on Parcel 2, 
Bradshaws would need to subdivide the property because it was not 
legally subdivided. (Transcript, p. 375) 
33. Shortly thereafter Defendant Gregory and Defendants 
Bradshaw applied for and went through the subdivision process for 
Parcel 2 and the subdivision was approved. (Transcript, p. 410, 
L. 1-8; p. 372, L. 11 - p. 373, L. 9; p. 167, L. 20 -p. 168, L. 
3) 
34. Salt Lake County Zoning ordinances require parcels of 
land to contain at least one half acre in the zone in which the 
property in question is located. If Parcel 2 is left with less 
than one-half acre, buildability is also questionable because of 
the grade and terrain. The owner would have to apply to the 
Zoning and Planning Commission for a variance, if the Defendant 
Gregory is left with less than a half acre, and there is no 
guarantee a variance would be granted. In fact, it took a long 
time for Zoning to approve a permit for Bradshaws' existing house 
11 
plan on the property because of the Zoning Commissions' concern 
over the steepness of the slope on the property* (Transcript, p. 
264, L. 1-25; p. 265, L. 1-15; p. 268, L. 6 - p. 269, L. 2; p. 
185, L. 22 - 186, L. 6) 
35. On October 11, 19 86, Dean Bradshaw discovered by 
measurement on Parcel 2 that the driveway was apparently not 
located where indicated and was instead located within the 
acreage he had purchased for Parcel 2. Measuring beyond the 
driveway, there was inadequate land between the driveway and the 
southeastern boundary of the property to locate his home, 
Bradshaws immediately advised Defendant Gregory of the problem 
and Gregory contacted Defendant McNeil. (Transcript, p. 169, L. 
20 - p. 171, L. 9; p. 381, L. 14 - p. 383, L. 4) 
36. Defendant Gregory did not contact the Grahns 
immediately about the mistake that had been discovered until 
approximately one day after the closing on the Bradshaw property, 
because until the closing the Defendant Gregory did not 
understand the magnitude of the problem; it was at that time they 
thought they understood the effect of the mistake; and they 
obtained counsel to get legal advice on what to do. Additionally, 
Gregory felt that the Earnest Money Agreement he had signed with 
Bradshaws was a legally binding contract, and that therefore he 
had to go through with the closing. (Transcript, p. 175, L. 23 -
p. 177, L. 9) 
37. On the day after the closing with Bradshaws, Defendant 
Gregory gave notice to Grahns of the error and offered possible 
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solutions to the problem created by the mistake. (Exhibit 8-P of 
Record) 
38. The Trial Court recognized that the Earnest Money 
Agreement between Defendant Gregory and Bradshaws was a legal and 
binding agreement. (Transcript, p. 176) 
39. On October 23, 1986, McNeil prepared a revised drawing 
showing what he believed to be the relationship of the Private 
Drive to Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. (See Exhibit 9-P of Record) 
40. Defendant McNeil subsequently prepared a revised survey 
of both parcels, showing the correct boundaries. (See Exhibit 
19-D of Record) (Note: In Appellants' previous Brief, Fact No. 
40, these Defendants erroneously referred to that survey as 
Exhibit 12-P.) 
41. Addendum A attached to this brief is a copy of the 
pertinent portion of Exhibit 1-P of the record, the original 
survey prepared by McNeil, showing Parcel 2 and what the parties 
believed was the nature of the property including the location of 
the road at the time they entered into the agreement. Only this 
pertinent and relevant portion of the oversized exhibit has been 
photocopied as Addendum "Aw for this brief so that the Addendum 
maintains the scale of the trial exhibit of 1 inch equals 20 
feet. Addendum B is a copy of the pertinent part of Exhibit 19-D 
of the record, the revised survey, showing where the road is 
actually located on the property. Again, only this pertinent and 
relevant part of the oversized exhibit has been photocopied as 
Addendum B to maintain the same scale of 1 inch equals 20 feet as 
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shown on Exhibit 19-D at trial. Zoning ordinances require a 30 
foot front yard set back from the road and a 10 foot side yard 
set back. Additionally, there is a 15 foot easement along the 
Southeastern edge of the driveway which Gregory granted to 
Grahns. According to the zoning requirements, the 15-foot 
easement and the revised survey, if the contract is reformed 
pursuant to the District Court's ruling, the buildable space on 
Parcel 2 is greatly reduced and is located on the steepest 
terrain on Parcel 2. (See Exh. 1-P and 19-D; Transcript p. 242, 
L. 4-13) 
42. Addendum C is a copy of page A-2 of Exhibit 18-D which 
was the drawing made by Bradshaws' architect showing the 
steepness of the slope of Parcel 2, the location of the slope in 
Parcel 2 and where the home Bradshaws designed was to be located 
on the property. (See Exh. 18-D) 
43. Addenda D and E are full-sized copies of Exhibits 1-P 
and 19-D, respectively, of which Addenda A and B relevant parts, 
respectively. 
44. Plaintiffs Grahn did not sell their prior home until 
March 1, 1987, which was three months after this lawsuit was 
commenced. (Transcript p. 116, L. 15-24) They did not move into 
the home on Parcel 1 until some seven months after this lawsuit 
was filed, and most of the time and money they spent in repairing 
and/or remodeling the home on Parcel 1 was spent after this 
lawsuit was filed. (Transcript, p. 115-116) 
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45. Plaintiffs Grahn and Defendant Gregory had an informal 
understanding that since Grahns had "gotten a good deal" on their 
purchase of Parcel 1, and that if at a later time they could 
purchase Parcel 2, Grahns were going to pay higher than value for 
Parcel 2 to even things out in the long run. (Transcript p. 125) 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE WAS ONLY ONE MISTAKE MADE BY THE 
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION - MISTAKEN 
ASSUMPTIONS BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS SURVEY 
(In Reply to Point I of Respondents' Brief) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn, in their brief, assert that 
there were two distinct mistakes made by the parties, one mutual 
and one unilateral. The facts, however, clearly establish the 
mistake in this transaction was a reliance placed on an erroneous 
survey. All parties relied on the survey which was erroneous and 
as a result all parties to the transaction misunderstood the 
nature of the property. As a result of the mistaken survey, the 
parties made a series of errors. The Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Grahn thought they were buying 1.11 acres which included a road. 
The Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw thought they had at least a 
half acre not including a road. These were in fact 
representations made by the Defendant/Appellant Gregory based 
upon a survey he had previously obtained from Defendant McNeil. 
The representations were flawed because the survey was flawed. 
The legal description obtained by Grahns was flawed because the 
survey was flawed because it didn't include the road. The legal 
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Appendix B 
Q AND ALSO THE HILLSIDE «^ Ui_u UL *-» .-..-*««.* ^W.^^.N.-
WITH RESPECT TO EXCAVATION AND WHAT WOULD NEED TO BE DONE 
ON THAT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q NOW, IS IT MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU SAID A 
VARIANCE COULD BE ATTAINED? 
A I DIDN'T SAY IT COULD. THEY MAY APPLY AND MAYBE 
IT WILL BE APPROVED; BUT THAT IS A WAY.OF PROCEEDING WITH 
A REDUCTION OF AREA. 
Q OKAY. I STAND CORRECTED. BUT THE BUILDABILITY 
OF THE LOT WOULD STILL BE AN ISSUE THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE 
APPROVED; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
MR. WOODBURY: THANK YOU. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: MR. WALKER? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WALKER: 
Q JUST A COUPLE QUESTIONS, MR. REYNOLDS. 
YOU STATED THAT THERE WAS NO BUILDING PERMIT IN 
THE FILE, BUT REALLY A BUILDING PERMIT WOULD NOT BE 
LOCATED IN THAT FILE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. THE BUILDING PERMIT DOES NOT 
GO IN SUBDIVISION FILES. 
Q WE'RE REFERRING TO A BUILDING PERMIT FOR .56 
ACRES; IS THAT CORRECT? 
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defendant's credibility under Rule 609(a). 
9. Defendant additionally complains that during 
crossexamination, the prosecutor questioned him 
concerning his unemployment. An appellate court 
has discretion as to the nature and extent of the 
opinions it renders and we need not "address in 
writing each and every argument, issue, or claim 
raised and properly before us on appeal." State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989); see State v. 
Jones, 783 P.2d 560, 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Defendant did not object to this questioning and we 
decline to specifically address this claim because it is 
not a substantial issue. 
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^ _ OPINION 
BILLINGS, JUDGE: 
Appellant Herold L. Gregory ("Gregory"), 
Trustee for and on behalf of the Marital and 
Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family 
Trust ("Trusts"), appeals from a district court 
order entered after a four-day trial reforming 
a land sale contract with appellees, Allen R. 
and Josephine M. Grahn ("Grahns"), and 
rescinding the sale of a contiguous parcel of 
land to appellants Dean and Christi Bradshaw 
("Bradshaws"). The Bradshaws also appeal the 
reformation of the Grahn/Gregory contract. 
The Grahns cross-appeal, claiming the trial 
UTAH 
court erred in (1) ordering them to pay for the 
additional acreage included after reformation, 
and (2) refusing to award attorney fees to 
them. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
We recite the facts in a light favorable to 
the decision of the fact finder. See Security 
State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 470-
71 (Utah 1987); Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 
1226, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
This dispute involves a parcel of land, 
owned by the Trusts, located at 2811 Brook-
burn Road in Salt Lake County. Before it was 
subdivided, the property was an estate consi-
sting of a home with private drive access. 
In 1984, the Trusts hired a surveyor to 
subdivide a one-half acre plot to be deeded 
to Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the 
Trusts. Danielson, with the knowledge of 
Gregory, instructed the surveyor to locate the 
one-half acre parcel in the southeast corner 
and to stake such a parcel "to the south and 
east off the road, us[ing] the road as the 
boundary." The larger remaining parcel was 
designated "parcel one" at trial, while the one-
half acre parcel was designated "parcel two." 
When the surveyor prepared the legal desc-
ription of parcel two, he made a four-degree 
error in describing a turn. Thus, the legal 
description of parcel two mistakenly included 
a part of the private drive which the Trusts 
and the surveyor intended to be included in 
parcel one. 
Danielson decided qot to build on parcel 
two and deeded the property back to the 
Trusts. Gregory then listed both parcels with a 
broker. Gregory directed the broker to advise 
potential buyers the survey stakes placed along 
the east side of the private driveway formed 
the boundary between the two parcels and to 
assure potential buyers the private drive pro-
viding access to the existing home was part of 
parcel one. 
The broker showed the property to the 
Grahns and advised them that either or both 
of the two parcels could be purchased. The 
broker removed snow from the survey stakes 
on the south and east side of the private drive 
to identify the boundary line between the two 
parcels and to confirm the private drive was 
part of par eel one. 
The Grahns sought assurances as to the 
physical boundaries of the parcels on nume-
rous occasions and explicitly stated they 
wanted the private drive as part of parcel one. 
The Grahns were not concerned about the 
acreage of parcel one, but with the physical 
boundaries of the property as identified by the 
survey stakes. The broker testified at trial that 
because of the unique nature of the estate, it 
would be unusual for the parties to be conce-
rned with the acreage rather than the physical 
boundaries of the property. 
Both the Grahns and Gregory understood 
and intended at the time the sale was negoti-
ated that the private drive would be included 
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in the sale of parcel one to the Grahns. 
After determining to purchase parcel one, 
the Grahns sought a legal description for the 
parcel to include in the Earnest Money Agre-
ement. Josephine Grahn telephoned the Gre-
gorys requesting a legal description and was 
referred to the tax notices. Josephine Grahn 
then went to the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office and obtained a legal description. App-
arently, the Recorder's Office had used the 
Danielson deed on parcel two as a basis for 
the legal description for parcel one. Thus, the 
Recorder's Office subtracted the .56 acres in 
parcel two from the 1.67 acreage of the total 
property and included an 1.11 acre figure in 
the legal description of parcel one. As a result 
of the mistake on the original survey, the 
Recorder's legal description of parcel one was 
not in conformity with the physical staked 
boundaries of parcel one. Neither the Grahns 
nor Gregory were aware of the mistaken legal 
description at this time. 
The Earnest Money Agreement recited the 
1.11 acre figure and the mistaken legal descr-
iption, but also provided for an easement for 
an aesthetic break between the properties 
which would extend into parcel two "from any 
point within fifteen (15) feet of the existing 
drive which separates the two lots ...." 
The Grahns and Gregory closed the sale of 
parcel one on August 1, 1986. The legal des-
cription in the deed for the property did not 
include the 1.11 acre figure.1 The Grahns also 
received a right of first refusal to purchase 
parcel two. 
On September 1, 1986, Gregory entered into 
an Earnest Money Agreement with the Brad-
shaws for the purchase of parcel two. The 
agreement provided the sale would close by 
September 15, 1986. Also on September 1, 
Gregory informed the Grahns of his intention 
to sell the property and extended them the 
right of first refusal on parcel two in accord-
ance with the option contained in the Grahn/ 
Gregory Earnest Money Agreement on parcel 
one. Under the Earnest Money Agreement, the 
Grahns had seven days to exercise the option. 
In the event the Grahns did not exercise the 
option, the agreement provided that Gregory 
could sell parcel two within 90 days under the 
same terms and conditions offered to the 
Grahns under the option. If, however, those 
terms changed, Gregory was required to offer 
the Grahns another option term. 
The Grahns did not exercise their right of 
first refusal and, when the option expired, told 
Gregory to proceed with the sale of parcel two 
to the Bradshaws. 
On October 11, 1986, Dean Bradshaw dis-
covered the private drive was apparently 
located within the legal description of parcel 
two. The Bradshaws informed Gregory. 
Gregory contacted the surveyor. The surveyor 
admitted his mistake and completed another 
survey which correctly placed the private drive 
within parcel one and yet still provided one-
half acre for parcel two in accordance with his 
original instructions. However, Gregory reje-
cted this survey because the Bradshaws could 
not construct the house they had designed on 
the re-drawn parcel. The surveyor was then 
instructed to draft a new survey without ref-
erence to the private drive as the boundary 
between the parcels. 
Prior to closing the sale of parcel two, 
Gregory gave the Bradshaws the opportunity 
to avoid their agreement, but they refused. On 
November 20, 1986, Gregory and the Brads-
haws closed the sale of parcel two using the 
original mistaken legal description. At that 
time, Gregory and the Bradshaws entered into 
another agreement which provided: "In the 
event that buyer cannot obtain the full .56 
acre according to the legal description, seller 
agrees to nullify sale and refund purchase 
price." 
Gregory did not inform the Grahns of the 
mistaken legal description until after closing 
the sale of parcel two with the Bradshaws. 
Gregory then informed the Grahns of the 
mistake and offered to either rescind their 
agreement or to relocate the private drive 
within the boundaries of the new parcel. 
The Grahns learned the Bradshaws planned 
to immediately begin construction on their 
new home on parcel two. The Grahns, there-
fore, obtained a temporary restraining order 
to block construction and commenced this 
lawsuit seeking reformation of their deed to 
include the private drive as part of parcel one. 
The temporary restraining order was converted 
to a preliminary injunction pending resolution 
of this dispute. 
The trial court, after a five-day bench 
trial, ordered reformation of the Grahns' 
deed, finding the deed did not conform to the 
agreement between Gregory and the Grahns to 
include the private drive in parcel one. In 
addition, the trial court ordered the Grahns to 
pay $12,604.06 as the fair market value of the 
land in excess of 1.11 acres which would be 
included in the reformed parcel. The trial 
court also rescinded the agreement between 
Gregory and the Bradshaws for the sale of 
parcel two. The court awarded costs to the 
Grahns, but did not award them attorney fees. 
Gregory appeals, claiming the trial court 
erred in ordering reformation rather than 
rescission of the sale of parcel one. The Bra-
dshaws appeal, claiming the court erred in 
determining they were not bona fide purcha-
sers, thus, cutting off the Grahns' reformation 
rights and, in addition, that the trial court 
erred in denying them damages for an unla-
wful injunction which caused them to lose the 
benefit of their bargain with a material supp-
lier. The Grahns cross-appeal, claiming the 
trial court erred in ordering them to pay for 
the additional acreage and in its denial of their 
request for attorney fees. 
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MUTUAL MISTAKE-REFORMATION 
OR RESCISSION? 
Gregory initially argues the trial court erred 
in reforming the sale of parcel one to include 
the private drive. Although he concedes the 
parties both mistakenly believed the private 
drive was included in parcel one, he contends 
that under the circumstances the proper 
remedy was rescission of the sale, not refor-
mation of the contract. Gregory argues the 
parties never agreed to the contract as refo-
rmed because both parties understood that 
only 1.11 acres were included in parcel one 
and this was an essential term of the contract 
as it left parcel two with the .56 acre necessary 
for his sale of parcel two to the Bradshaws. 
Under certain circumstances, courts may 
reform an agreement to reflect the intent of 
the parties. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§155 (1981)2 states that w[w]here a writing 
that evidences or embodies an agreement in 
whole or in part fails to express the agreement 
because of a mistake of both parties as to the 
contents or effect of the writing, the court 
may at the request of a party reform the 
writing to express the agreement, except to the 
extent that rights of third parties such as good 
faith purchasers for value will be unfairly 
affected. "3 
The Utah Supreme Court set out the criteria 
which must be met before reformation is 
permissible in Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 
1271 (Utah 1984), a case similar to the one 
before us. The court stated: 
Reformation of a deed is a procee-
ding in equity and is appropriate 
where the terms of the written ins-
trument are mistaken in that they 
do not show the true intent of the 
agreement between the parties. 
There are two grounds for reform-
ation of such an agreement: mutual 
mistake of the parties and ignorance 
or mistake by one party, coupled 
with fraud by the other party. 
This case is a clear case of mutual 
mistake by the parties. The defen-
dant and all subsequent purchasers 
except plaintiff agreed that the 
understanding and the intent of the 
parties to the various deeds was that 
the fence line be the boundary. It 
was only due to a mistake made by 
the drafter of the deed as to the 
metes and bounds described that the 
deed did not conform to the intent 
of the parties. Reformation is 
clearly appropriate where there is a 
variance between the written deed 
and the true agreement of the 
parties caused by a draftsman. 
I. at 1273 (footnotes omitted). See aiso Guar-
an State Bank v. Stangl, 11% P.2d 1, 4-
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7 (Utah 1989); Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 
772 (Utah 1985).' 
Reformation is appropriate where the 
written instrument is not in conformity with 
the parties' agreement, not where the parties 
have failed to agree. We will not make a 
contract for the parties which they did not 
make, only reform a contract to reflect the 
agreement they actually made.5 
The trial court specifically found Gregory 
had told the Grahns that the private drive was 
included in parcel one. In addition, the court 
found that both parties understood the private 
drive was included in parcel one and the legal 
description did not conform to the parties' 
agreement. There is also evidence that the 
parties were not concerned with the size of 
parcel one, but only with the physical staked 
boundaries of the property.6 We note that we 
review the trial judge's findings of fact under 
the standard set forth in Rule 52 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure: "Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evid-
ence, shall not be set aside unless clearly err-
oneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). This "clearly erroneous" standard 
applies whether the case is one in equity, as is 
this case, or one at law. See Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1989); Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 
551(Utah Ct. App. 1987). The trial court's 
findings are amply supported by the evidence. 
Only Gregory's self-serving statements 
support his argument that the acreage included 
in parcel one was essential to the parties' 
agreement. The Utah Supreme Court has 
previously held that when a party requesting 
rescission offers only self-serving statements 
concerning the materiality of the mistake, that 
testimony is insufficient to support an order 
for rescission. See Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 
9,13-14 (Utah 1982). 
We agree with the trial court that the parties 
intended the private drive to be included in 
parcel one and the legal description did not 
conform to those intentions and thus conclude 
the trial court correctly reformed the deed of 
parcel one to reflect the parties' actual agre-
ement. 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE 
As a secondary claim, Gregory asserts that 
his unilateral mistake that there would be 
sufficient acreage for the Bradshaws to build 
on parcel two is grounds to rescind the sale of 
parcel one to the Grahns. 
The standard for determining whether res-
cission is the proper remedy for a unilateral 
mistake is as follows: 
1. The mistake must be of so grave 
a consequence that to enforce the 
contract as actually made would be 
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unconscionable. 
2. The matter as to which the 
mistake was made must relate to a 
material feature of the contract. 
3. Generally the mistake must have 
occurred notwithstanding the exer-
cise of ordinary diligence by the 
party making the mistake. 
4. It must be possible to give relief 
by way of rescission without serious j 
prejudice to the other party except 
the loss of his bargain. In other 
words, it must be possible to put 
him in status quo. | 
B & A Assocs. v. L.A. Young Sons Constr. 
Co., 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 12 (Utah 1990) j 
(quoting John Call Eng'g v. Manti City Corp., j 
743 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Utah 1987)); see also 
Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 Utah 650, 
231 P.2d 724, 727 (1951). 
The appellant must marshal all the evidence 
which supports the trial court's findings and 
show that, in the light most favorable to the 
finding, it is against the "'clear weight of the 
evidence," and is thus clearly erroneous when 
applied to the foregoing legal principles. See 
Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 
1222, 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also 
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Gregory has failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings and 
then to demonstrate that the trial court's 
findings were clearly erroneous.7 Thus, we will 
not disturb the trial court's reformation of the 
deed.8 
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
The Bradshaws contend they are bona fide 
purchasers of parcel two and thus cut off the 
Grahns' right to reform the deed on parcel 
one.9 The Bradshaws admit they knew of the 
mistaken description before the sale of parcel 
two was completed, but argue they submitted 
their Earnest Money Agreement on parcel two 
without notice of the mistaken legal descrip-
tion and consequent problems and since the 
Earnest Money Agreement is a binding cont-
ract, see Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 
805 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), they are bona fide 
purchasers. The Grahns, on the other hand, 
argue the relevant time for determining bona 
fide purchaser status is at the time of 
"purchase," i.e., at the closing of the sale. 
In Utah, it is clear that a bona fide purch-
aser can cut off the right of reformation. See 
Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 
(Utah 1984) ("the right of reformation of a 
deed can be cut off by purchase of the prop-
erty by a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice of the mistake "). 
The case law implies the essential time to 
measure knowledge is at the time of the actual 
sale. A bona fide purchaser is "one who takes 
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without actual or constructive knowledge of 
facts sufficient to put him on notice of the 
complainant's equity." Blodgett v. Marsh, 590 
P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court, in defining 
notice, has stated that 
[ajctual or constructive notice 
defeats a subsequent purchaser's 
interest. A subsequent purchaser 
must therefore, show that he had 
no actual notice, i.e., no personal 
knowledge, of a prior conveyance 
or that the prior conveyance did not 
impart constructive notice, i.e., was 
not recorded before his conveyance 
in the same land was recorded. 
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch 
Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 906 n.2 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam) (emphasis added). See also Diversified 
Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
739 P.2d 113., 1136 (Utah 1987) (if a subs-
equent purchaser has information or facts 
which would put a prudent person upon 
inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to 
actual knowledge, an unrecorded conveyance 
is not void as against that subsequent purch-
aser). 
The Bradshaws discovered the mistake in 
the legal description more than one month 
before they closed on the sale of parcel two 
with Gregory. Gregory and the Bradshaws 
further agreed in writing that the sale would 
be nullified if the conveyance could not be as 
planned.-We agree with the trial court that the 
Bradshaws were not bona fide purchasers of 
parcel two.10 
PAYMENT FOR ADDITIONAL ACREAGE 
The Grahns appeal the trial court's order 
requiring them to pay for the additional 
acreage in the reformed deed, claiming the 
acreage included in parcel one was not a basis 
for the bargain between the Grahns and 
Gregory. They claim the agreement was that 
parcel one as circumscribed by the staked 
boundaries was to be sold for the agreed price. 
We agree. 
The Earnest Money Agreement drafted by 
the Grahns recited the 1.11 acre figure, but 
also stated that the private drive divided the 
two parcels. The deed to parcel one did not 
recite the size of the property. We do not find 
that this mistaken designation of the size of 
parcel one was central to the parties' bargain. 
The trial court stated in Finding 13: "The 
description to Parcel One was obtained by 
plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County 
Recorder[']s Office. The description design-
ated Parcel One as being 1.11 acres and acc-
epted by the trustee and defendants Grahn as 
acreage to be sold and purchased." 
This finding conflicts with the trial court's 
Finding of Fact 14 which states Gregory and 
the Grahns understood the private drive to be 
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boundary and that the technical descrip-
i did not conform to the intents of the 
ties. We therefore conclude that Finding of 
t 13 is clearly erroneous in light of the 
lence and its inconsistency with the court's 
er findings and conclusions. The trial 
rt's order requiring the Grahns to pay for 
additional acreage included is therefore 
ersed. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The Grahns also appeal the trial court's 
lial of their request for attorney fees, clai-
tig they should be awarded attorney fees 
:ause the evidence demonstrated that 
egory breached the option agreement, and 
t for that breach, this lawsuit would not 
ve resulted. 
In Utah, parties may recover attorney fees 
ly if provided for by contract or authorized 
statute. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
4 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); see also Arnica 
ut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 
Itah Ct. App. 1989). Further, w[i]f provided 
r by contract, the award of attorney fees is 
lowed only in accordance with the terms of 
e contract." Bracken, 764 P.2d at 988. 
The contractual language in the Earnest 
toney Agreement which provides for attorney 
es states: 
Both parties agree that, should 
either party default in any of the 
covenants or agreements herein 
contained, the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses, inclu-
ding a reasonable attorneys' fee, 
which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing or terminating this agre-
ement, or in pursuing any remedy 
provided hereunder or by applicable 
law, whether such remedy is 
pursued by filing suit or otherwise. 
The Earnest Money Agreement between the 
3rahns and Gregory included a first right of 
efusal option on parcel two. The contractual 
anguage of that option provided: 
Should Buyer fail to exercise 
Buyers' option under this provi-
sion, then Seller shall have the right 
to sell the property within ninety 
(90) days of the date of the expira-
tion of Sellers' said option on terms 
and conditions no more favorable 
than those originally offered under 
this paragraph to Buyer. Should the 
offer be amended making the terms 
more favorable, or should the said 
offer fail and a new offer be rece-
ived, then the said amendment or 
offer shall be, once again, subject 
to the terms of this provision. The 
terms of this provision shall survive 
the closing of the purchase of the 
property which is the subject of the 
UTAH 
main Agreement. 
The Grahns contend that after they declined 
to exercise their option to purchase parcel two, 
Gregory offered the Bradshaws more favor-
able terms and therefore Gregory breached the 
option agreement when he did not offer the 
option to the Grahns again. The Grahns assert 
that the more favorable terms are the exten-
sion of the closing date past September 15 and 
the additional agreement providing that if 
Gregory could not convey the entire .56 acres, 
the agreement was void. 
The trial court did not make a specific 
finding concerning the cause of action for 
breach of the option. The court did find, 
however, that the w[t]rustee thereafter offered 
plaintiffs a first right of refusal to purchase 
Parcel Two which was not exercised by plai-
ntiff." While not stating so directly, we con-
clude the trial court inferentially found no 
breach of the option agreement. Furthermore, 
the issue of this lawsuit concerns the amount 
of property the parties intended to convey by 
the sale of parcel one and is not the result of 
any breach of the option to purchase parcel 
two. Thus, we find that there was no default 
of the option agreement and the trial court 
correctly concluded that attorney fees should 
not be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold the trial court correctly reformed 
the land sale contract on parcel one because a 
mistake in the legal description included in the 
deed did not reflect the parties' agreement. 
We conclude the trial court was correct in 
finding the Bradshaws were not bona fide 
purchasers of parcel two and thus could not 
cut off the Grahns' right to reformation. 
Additionally, we affirm the trial court's con-
clusion that the Grahns were not entitled to 
attorney fees as this dispute did not result 
from a breach of the option agreement. 
However, we reverse the trial court's order 
requiring the Grahns to pay for the additional 
acreage included in the reformed deed as the 
facts clearly support a finding that the parties 
agreed to purchase and sell parcel one based 
on the physical boundaries of the parcel and 
decided on a price for that parcel without 
regard to the acreage of parcel one. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. In fact, the Warranty Deed from Gregory to the 
Grahns included a legal description different from 
that in the Earnest Mone> Agreement. The source 
of this legal description is unknown. The legal des-
cription in the Trust Deed from the Grahns to 
Gregory was identical to the one in the Warranty 
Deed. Neither instrument recited the 1.11 acre 
figure. 
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2. Gregory asserts the applicable Restatement 
section is section 152, which states that 
[wjhere a mistake of both parties at the 
time the contract was made as to a basic 
assumption on which the contract was 
made and has a material affect on the 
agreed exchange of performances, the 
contract is voidable by the adversely 
affected party unless he bears the risk of 
mistake.... 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §152 (1981). 
The Restatement notes, however, that 
[t]he mere fact that both parties are 
mistaken with respect to such an assu-
mption does not, of itself, afford a 
reason for avoidance of the contract by 
the adversely affected party. Relief is 
only appropriate in situations where a 
mistake of both parties has such a 
material effect on the agreed exchange 
of performances as to upset the very 
basis for the contract. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §152, comment 
a, at 386 (1981). 
3. A commentator describes the type of mistake a 
court may correct through reformation: 
If, on account of a mistake common to 
both parties to a bilateral transaction the 
written instrument does not express the 
true agreement of the parties, equity will 
generally correct the instrument so as to 
conform to the actual bargain. Perhaps 
the most common instance is that of a 
conveyance which, because of a mistake 
of the scrivener not discovered by either 
party, describes too much or too little 
property.... 
G. Clark, Equity §248, at 370-71 (1954). 
4. See, e.g., Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 
64-65 (Utah 1977) (the written instrument failed to 
conform with the intent of the parties and the court 
reformed the deed to increase the size of the parcel 
conveyed to include the boundaries on which the 
parties had agreed). 
5. We distinguish on their facts several cases 
Gregory cites in support of his argument that resci-
ssion is the appropriate remedy. Robert Langston, 
Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (The parties agreed to the sale of a 
ranching operation which included grazing permits, 
cattle and personal property. However, the parties 
were mistaken about the grazing permits, which had 
been cancelled; about the number of cattle; and also 
about the price and terms.); Eiland v. Powell, 136 
W. Va. 25, 65 S.E.2d 737, 742 (1951) (the legal 
description in the deed was identical to the legal 
description in the contract, thus there was no 
mistake by a drafter, just in the representations 
made by the seller); Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. 
McGraff, 249 Md. 480, 240 A.2d 245, 249 (Ct. 
App. 1968) (There was no mistake in the legal des-
cription of the property, the seller had misreprese-
nted the boundaries. The court correctly concluded 
the parties did not come to an agreement in the first 
instance.); Our facts are much closer to the case of 
Bartlett v. Department of Transp., 40 Md. App. 47, 
388 A.2d 930 (1978). In Bartlett, the court dealt 
with the issue of reformation of a deed when the 
parties believed the parcel to be 2-1/2 acres 
smaller than it actually was. The Bartlett court rea-
soned that if a discrepancy in the size of the parcel 
would not have prevented the party from entering 
the contract, the mistake is immaterial and reform-
ation is appropriate. Id. at 933. 
6. Despite the trial court's findings, Gregory's 
primary argument in favor of rescission is that he 
would never have entered the agreement to sell 
parcel one if he had known there would not be a 
one-half acre parcel left in parcel two after the 
subdivision. 
Gregory's position fails for several reasons. First, 
prior to the sale of parcel two to the Bradshaws, the 
surveyor drafted a revised survey using the private 
drive as a boundary which left parcel two with one-
half acre, but Gregory rejected that survey because 
the Bradshaws' house would not fit on it. If, in 
fact, Gregory's concern was only with parcel two 
containing one-half acre, the revised survey would 
have satisfied those concerns. Further, when 
Gregory originally entered into the sale of parcel 
one to the Grahns, the Grahns had an option to 
purchase parcel two, thus the subsequent fact that 
the Bradshaws' house plans would not fit on the 
property as agreed to or the fact that a variance 
would have to be obtained would not have been 
relevant at the time of the original sale of parcel 
one. 
1. Even if Gregory had marshaled the evidence, 
however, we find from our independent review of 
the evidence that all elements for rescission based 
upon unilateral mistake were not met. 
Gregory's unilateral mistake did not relate to a 
material feature of the contract because, as previo-
usly discussed, the size of parcel two was not a 
material element in negotiating the sale of parcel 
one. 
Finally, Gregory's bald assertion that the Grahns 
can receive damages to put them back to the status 
quo is without support in the evidence. The evidence 
at trial established that the Grahns sold their prior 
home, invested at least $10,000 in improvements to 
parcel one and put over 1600 hours of time making 
the property livable and unique to their tastes. 
8. Gregory also argues that under Utah law, a con-
tract is merged into the deed and that when the deed 
refers to a metes and bounds description which 
differs from oral references to the private drive as 
the boundary, the description in the deed prevails. 
Mutual mistake is an exception to the general rule 
that parol evidence may not contradict, vary, or add 
to a deed. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 981 
(Utah 1979). The doctrine of merger is inapplicable 
where, as here, one of the parties demonstrates a 
mutual mistake in the drafting of the contractual 
documents has occurred. 
9. The Grahns argue the Bradshaws are not proper 
appellants as they have not appealed the rescission 
of their agreement with Gregory for the sale of 
parcel two. We disagree. The argument in the Bra-
dshaws' appeal, by inference, appeals the rescission 
of the Gregory/Bradshaw agreement. By asserting 
they are bona fide purchasers, thereby cutting off 
the Grahns' reformation rights, the Bradshaws are 
appealing the rescission of their contract which res-
ulted from that reformation. 
10. The Bradshaws argue they had an enforceable 
contract with Rocky Mountain Refractories and as a 
result of the wrongful injunction against building on 
parcel two, they are entitled to damages for the loss 
of that bargain. 
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In Finding 21, the trial court found that 
"|d}efendant Bradshaw did not have an enforceable 
agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories." The 
Bradshaws merely baldly reassert that an enforce-
able agreement existed and do not sustain their 
burden on appeal to marshal the evidence in support 
of finding 21 and demonstrate the finding was 
clearly erroneous. Even so, there is ample evidence 
in the record to support the trial court's finding. 
The representative of Rocky Mountain testified that 
(1) there was no written contract, (2) other parties 
would have to perform before that contract could 
have been entered and those third parties had not 
performed, and (3) no firm price or estimate of 
materials had been reached. Thus, we conclude that 
the trial court did not err in finding that there was 
no enforceable agreement between Rocky Mountain 
Refractories and the Bradshaws. 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Kathleen Nyrehn petitions this court for 
review of the Industrial Commission's denial 
of workers* compensation benefits. We 
reverse. 
Nyrehn worked as a stock room clerk for 
Fred Meyer Stores. Her duties included pricing 
and sorting merchandise contained in tubs 
which were approximately 2 1/2 feet wide, 2 
1/2 feet long, and 1 1/2 to 2 feet tall. The 
tubs weighed between fifteen and forty pounds 
each, depending on the contents, and were 
stacked upon each other. Nyrehn would lift 
and carry the tubs to and from a sorting area 
approximately thirty to thirty-six times a 
day. In addition to lifting the tubs, Nyrehn 
was involved in constant bending and stooping 
to sort merchandise into different tubs. On 
January 23, 1985, at approximately 11:00 
a.m., Nyrehn felt a gradual onset of pain in 
her lower back while performing her duties at 
work. Despite the pain she continued to work. 
The pain worsened until she finally had to 
leave work early at approximately 4:00 p.m. 
After three back operations, Nyrehn's pain 
persisted and she was still unable to work. She 
therefore sought permanent disability benefits. 
After a hearing, an Administrative Law 
Judge (A.L.J.) made the following relevant 
findings of fact: (1) Nyrehn's pain of January 
23, 1985 was not the result of a certain inci-
dent or activity, but rather the result of "two 
and [a] half months of lifting tubs of merch-
andise 30 to 36 times a day;" (2) Nyrehn had 
an asymptomatic preexisting condition, spon-
dylolysis (disintegration or dissolution of a 
vertebra); and (3) 75% of Nyrehn's total 
permanent impairment existing at examination 
was "caused by the industrial accident of 
January 23, 1985," and 25% was due to 
"preexisting incapacity of spondylolysis." 
The A.L.J, also made the following relevant 
conclusions of law: (1) Nyrehn injured her 
lower back "by accident" in that her injury 
was neither planned nor foreseen; (2) there 
was a direct medical causal relationship 
between the industrial accident and Nyrehn's 
back problems; (3) due to her preexisting 
condition, Nyrehn was required to prove legal 
causation under Allen v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986); and (4) 
Nyrehn's job duties of lifting tubs of merch-
andise weighing between fifteen and forty 
pounds did not amount to unusual or extrao-
rdinary exertion in excess of the normally 
expected level of nonemployment activity for 
men and women in the latter half of the twe-
ntieth century as required in Allen.1 
Despite his conclusion that Nyrehn failed to 
satisfy the Allen test, the A.L.J, awarded 
Nyrehn permanent total disability benefits. He 
refused to apply Allen because he felt that the 
test was at odds with other Utah Supreme 
Court cases indicating that handicapped 
workers should not be placed in a hardship in 
receiving compensation benefits. He also ind-
icated that he believed the Allen test to be 
unconstitutional because it set a different 
standard for such handicapped workers. 
Fred Meyer Stores and Liberty Mutual 
Insurance (referred to collectively as Fred 
Meyer) filed a motion with the Industrial 
Commission to review the A.L.J.'s award. On 
review, the Commission adopted the factual 
findings of the A.L.J, and his conclusion that 
Nyrehn failed to prove legal causation as 
required under Allen. The Commission then 
reversed the A.L.J.'s award of benefits, ind-
icating that despite the A.L.J.'s concerns over 
the constitutionality of the Allen test, the 
Commission was required to apply the test. 
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